ABSTRACT The telecare medical information systems (TMISs) provide the convenience to the patients/users to be served at home. Along with such ease, it is essential to preserve the privacy and to provide the security to the patients/users in TMIS. Often, authentication protocols are adopted to guarantee privacy and secure interaction between the patients/users and remote server. Recently, Chaudhry et al. pointed out that Islam et al.'s scheme based on smart card is prone to user impersonation and server impersonation attacks. Chaudhry et al. later presented an enhanced scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography to remedy the weaknesses of Islam et al.'s scheme. Unfortunately, we find some important limitations in both schemes. We remark that their scheme is prone to off-line password guessing attack, user/server impersonation attack, and man-in-middle attack. To overcome these limitations, we present an improved authentication scheme keeping apart the threats encountered in the design of Chaudhry et al.'s scheme. Moreover, the presented scheme can also resist all known attacks. We prove the security of the proposed scheme with the help of widespread Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. A brief comparison with the previous works provides that the presented protocol is more efficient and more secure than other related schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of networking and communication technologies in the recent past, telecare medical information systems (TMIS) offer an efficient and convenient connection between patients and the medical server. The patients can be served with the medical services via public networks, hence, the privacy preservation is considered as a very critical issue in TMIS. Hitherto, numerous authentication and key agreement schemes are proposed for TMIS.
The original authentication scheme is based on hyper text transport protocol (HTTP) digest authentication and was proposed in 1999 [11] . In 2005, Yang et al. [37] proved it insecure and proposed the improved version based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The authors remarked it as vulnerable against the off-line password guessing attack and the server-spoofing attack. Subsequently, Yang et al. [37] also proposed an improved scheme to improve security. However, in 2006 Huang et al. [14] pointed that Yang et al. ' s [37] scheme cannot resist the stolen-verifier, the off-line password guessing and the Denning-Sacco attacks as well as it is not suitable for the low computation power equipments because of the high computational cost [7] , [13] . In 2005, Durlanik and Sogukpinar [8] firstly use the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to propose an efficient authentication scheme in the foundation of Yang et al.'s [37] work. In precise terms, the ECC could provide the same security with a smaller key size as compared to the traditional public key cryptography. In many subsequent works, numerous authentication schemes are proposed using ECC [2] , [6] , [10] , [21] , [25] , [26] , [38] - [40] . However, most among these protocols for TMIS have some security limitations. Therefore, it is a challenging academic topic to design a more secure session key agreement scheme.
In 2013, Xu et al. proposed a secure and efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECC for TMIS. The underlying scheme provides the patient anonymity by employing the dynamic identity. However, in 2014 Islam et al. pointed out that Xu et al.'s protocol is not appropriate for practical use because: (1) it fails to provide strong authentication in login and authentication phases; (2) it does not facilitate to update the password correctly during the password change phase; (3) it does not provide the revocation of lost/stolen smart card; and (4) it fails to resist the strong replay attack. To overcome the security weaknesses of Xu In this paper, we concentrate on revisiting the scheme of Chaudhry et al. and present a more secure and efficient scheme. We find that Chaudhry et al.'s scheme is also susceptible to off-line password guessing attack, server impersonation attack, user impersonation attacks and man-in-middle attack. We observe that off-line identity guessing attack is a fatal attack in their protocol. In our proposed protocol, we utilize the technique of ''fuzzy-verifiers'' [31] to resist off-line identity guessing attack. Moreover, our scheme not only addresses the security problems of Chaudhry et al.'s [5] and Islam and Khan's [16] schemes, but also retains all their merits as depicted in Table 5 . Although, our scheme employs complex elliptic curve point multiplication operation, however, as a trade off, it offers resistance against all known-attacks. In terms of safety performance and efficiency, the proposed scheme is more secure and efficent and has many excellent features compared with counterparts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces some notations and the capacities of adversary. The review and cryptanalysis of Chaudhry et al.'s scheme is detailed in Section III and Section IV. Section V presents our proposed scheme. Section VI and Section VII present a conventional and a BAN-Logic security analysis of our scheme, respectively. The performance and functionality comparisons among the proposed scheme and other related schemes are discussed in Section VIII. Finally, concluding thoughts are detailed in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we show some notations and introduces the capacities of adversary of the authentication scheme. Some notations used in this paper are displayed in Table 1 .
A. THREAT MODEL
Throughout this paper, according to [28] and [31] , the capacities of the adversary A are summarized as follows:
1. The adversary A is able to control the open communication channel completely, that is, he can intercept, modify, 
III. REVIEW OF CHAUDHRY ET AL.'s SCHEME
In this section, we review Chaudhry et al.'s authentication scheme [5] for TMIS. Their scheme is composed of three phases including registration phase, login phase and authentication phase, and password updating phase.
A. THE REGISTRATION PHASE
Step 1: Firstly the patient U i picks up his identity, password, and a random number as ID i , PW i and r i ∈ Z * p , respectively. Subsequently, U i computes l i = h(ID i ||PW i ||r i ) and resultant l i along with ID i that is transmitted towards server S over a secure channel.
Step 2: After receiving registration request from particular patient U i , server S performs the identity verification. If U i is a new user, it set t i = 0, otherwise sets t i = t i + 1 and stores {ID i , t i } in its database. Afterwards, S chooses a random number b s and com-
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B. THE LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
The login process proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Patient U i enters his identity ID i and password PW i , then the smart card computes as follows:
and 
Step 2: Once receiving m i , S verifies the validity of T i 1 .
If it is not valid, S ends the session. Otherwise, 
and stores {ID i , N i , T i 2 } in its database. Finally, S sends the following
Step 3: After receiving m s , U i checks the validity of T i 2 and subsequently computes the following:
U i then verifies whether G s is equal to G s and ends the session if not equal. Otherwise U i accepts the session key SK .
C. PASSWORD UPDATING PHASE
Firstly, U i inserts the smart card SC into the card reader and then inputs its ID i , PW i . Afterwards, the smart card computes the followings:
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHAUDHRY ET AL.'s SCHEME
In this section, we show that Chaudhry et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, (user) server impersonation attack and man-in-middle attack. These attacks are also based on the assumptions that a malicious adversary A has total control over the communication channel connecting U and S in authentication phase. Thus, A can intercept, insert, delete, or modify any messages transmitted via public channel [9] , [20] , [35] .
A. OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
In off-line password guessing attack, the adversary A stole the legal user's smart card and extracts some useful parameters from it, and/or intercepts the messages from insecure channel, then A tries to guess the user's correct password and identity. In this subsection, we show that the scheme of Chaudhry et al. cannot resist off-line password guessing attack. We give the attack in four cases as below:
• Case 1: (Via verification value in smart card) In this case, the adversary A firstly only extracts the datum {u i , r i } stored in smart card. Afterwards, A can guess the legal user U 's password and identity by performing the following steps: Step1: A first guesses PW * and ID * from the password dictionary space D PW and the identity dictionary space D ID , respectively. Step2:
Step4: A checks whether u * i is equal to the value of parameter u i . If they are equal, A finds the correct password and identity of user U . Otherwise, A can repeat steps (1), (2), (3) and (4) [29] , [30] , therefore, the above attack is quite efficient in the first case. In fact, 7454 VOLUME 6, 2018 the reason for the success of the above attack is that, A obtains the verification value u i in smart card and uses it to verify the correctness of the guessing password and identity. We observe that, the purpose of the designer is to verify the legitimacy of the login with this data u i and to help legal user freely change his password locally no needing to communicate with the server.
• Case 2: (Via verification value in public channel)
In this case, the adversary A intercepts the login request messages {C i , G i , T i 1 } and extracts the datum
Afterwards, A also can guess the legal user U 's password and identity by performing the following steps: Step1: A first guesses PW * and ID * from the password dictionary space D PW and the identity dictionary space D ID , respectively.
A calculates the following:
Step5: A checks whether G * i is equal to the value of parameter G i in login messages. If they are equal, A finds the correct password and identity of user U . Otherwise, A can repeat steps (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) until finding the correct password and identity. The time complexity of the above attack is also: O(|D Pw | * |D ID | * (2T h +T m +T a )). Therefore, the attack based on the second case is also quite efficient. Actually, the reason for the success of the above attack is that, A obtains the verification value G i in login request messages and uses it to verify the correctness of the guessing password and identity.
• Case 3: (The legitimate patient acts as an attacker I)
In this case, we show that a legitimate patient U j can act as a malicious opponent A for off-line password guessing attack. The adversary A extracts the datum
, r i } stored in smart card. Afterwards, A also can guess the legal user U 's password and identity by performing the following steps: Step1: Firstly, U j extracts the following datum
Step2: A(U j ) guesses PW * and ID * from the password dictionary space D PW and the identity dictionary space D ID , respectively.
A checks whether (k s G) * is equal to the value of parameter k s G in Step 1. If they are equal, A finds the correct password and identity of user U .
Otherwise, A can repeat steps (2), (3), (4) and (5) until finding the correct password and identity. The time complexity of the above attack is :
. Therefore, the above attack based on the third case is also quite efficient. By observing, we find that the key reason for the success of the above attack is that, any legal patient can computes the common value k s G, then A guesses the password and identity of the other users and computes (k s G) * . If the guessing is correct, it must result in k s G = (k s G) * . According to the complexity, it shows that A can verify the correctness of the guessing password and identity.
• Case 4: (The legitimate patient acts as an attacker II) Similarly to Case 3, we also show that a legitimate patient U j can act as a malicious opponent A for off-line password guessing attack. But the adversary A extracts the datum {u i , E/E p , G, r i } stored in smart card. Whereafter, A guesses the legal user U 's password and identity by implementing the following steps: Step1: U j extracts the following datum
from his own smart card and computes
Step5: A checks whether u * i is equal to the value of parameter u i in Step 1. If they are equal, A finds the correct password and identity of user U . Otherwise, A can repeat steps (2), (3), (4) and (5) until finding the correct password and identity. The time complexity of the above attack is : O(T h + T m + T a + |D Pw | * |D ID | * 2T h ). Therefore, the above attack based on the fourth case is also quite efficient. Similarly to Case 3, the key reason for the success of the above attack is that, any legal patient can computes the common value k s G, then A guesses the password and identity of the other users but computes u * i . If u i = u * i , it is assured that the guessing is correct. Therefore, any of the above cases illustrates that the scheme of Chaudhry et al. cannot resist off-line password guessing attack.
B. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Once the scheme of Chaudhry et al. is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack, the adversary becomes capable to impersonate other legal patients/users. To do so, the adversary A captures the login request message {T i 1 } and performs the following steps. Step1: A computes l i = h(ID i ||PW i ||R i ) by the already guessed correct identity and password. Subsequently,
selects a random number a * i ∈ Z * p and computes the followings:
and
Then, A sends the following login request message
Step2: After receiving the login request message from A, S checks the timestamp T i1 and then computes
Step3: Upon reception of the challenge message from server S, A computes C * is = a * i (G s ) and then calculates the session key as follows:
Thus, an adversary A can impersonate successfully a legal patient/user to the server. Therefore, Chaudhry et al.'s scheme becomes insecure against user impersonation attack.
C. SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
According to off-line password guessing attack, once the scheme of Chaudhry et al. is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack, the adversary A obtains the correct 
It is obvious that these expressions are equal. Therefore, U i accepts the session key SK with the server who is indeed the adversary A. Accordingly, the adversary A successfully launches a server impersonation attack and gets a session key SK with U i . Moreover, since A also obtains k s G of server S and computes h(ID||k s ) = l i ⊕ O i utilizing the obtained sensitive information, the adversary can perform similar server impersonation attacks on all users. Therefore, the scheme cannot resist server impersonation attack.
D. MAN-IN-MIDDLE ATTACK
According to our analyses, we have shown that Chaudhry et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and server impersonation attack. It is easy to understand that the adversary can impersonate patient/user to server and vice versa. Therefore, the adversary can launch the man-in-middle attack. Thus, it is remarked that Chaudhry et al.'s scheme cannot resist man-inmiddle attack.
V. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
The underlying section proposes an improved mutual authentication scheme based on ECC for TMIS. In our scheme, we use random numbers to avoid replay attack, therefore, we don't need to assume that both U i and S are synchronized with their clocks. Meanwhile, the proposed scheme not only overcomes weaknesses of Chaudhry et al.'s [5] scheme and Islam and Khan's [16] scheme, but also achieves mutual authentication and resists various attacks. The proposed scheme consists of three phases: registration phase, authentication and key agreement phase, and password changing phase. The notations of the proposed protocol are listed in Table 1 and the registration and authentication process of our scheme is presented in Fig. 1 .
A. REGISTRATION PHASE

The patient U i chooses a password PW i , an identity
ID i and a random number r i ∈ Z * p . Subsequently,
3. After receiving the registration message, S chooses a random number r s ∈ Z * p and calculates the following:
and stores {ID i , r s } in its database, where n 0 is an integer and 2 4 ≤ n 0 ≤ 2 8 [31] . 4. S ⇒ U i : a smart card SC containing
U i stores r i in SC.
B. LOGIN AND MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PHASE
Once the patient U i registers to the server successfully, he can send the login request to the server S when he wants to be served follows: 
After obtaining {PID i , G i }, S calculates the following:
firstly by using the stored datum and server's private key. S then computes ID i ||C i = PID i ⊕ T and checks
= ID i by searching database list. If they are not equal, S judges that the input password is wrong. Once the wrong times exceeds a fixed value (such as 5), S forms a judgement that the smart card has been usurped by some attacker. What's more, S locks the smart card until U i re-registers. Otherwise, S computes G i = h(ID i ||T ||C i ) and verifies G i ? = G i . In case of invalidation, S exits the session and counts a number N = 1. And S suspends the card until U i re-registers in case if N exceeds some threshold value (such as 5). Otherwise, S generates a random number c s and computes the following: 
S →
C. PASSWORD UPDATING PHASE
This phase facilitates the user to update her/his password on its own will for which U i and S can execute the following steps and the password updating process of our scheme is presented in Fig. 2 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove that our scheme can withstand all known attacks.
A. USER ANONYMITY
In the proposed scheme, on the one hand, there is no identity notions transmitted in the open channel. On the other hand, suppose the adversary A eavesdrops the messages {PID i , G i } and {C s , G s } from the public channel. But to obtain the correct identity ID i of U i , A is needed T that is not available since T is protected by the private key k s of S. Moreover, A cannot guess the correct identity, since, C i = a i G is not available. Further, even if A obtains the smart card of U i and extracts the information in SC, A cannot recover the identity of U i since ID i is protected by one-way hash function and modulo operator. Therefore, our proposed scheme provides the user anonymity.
B. OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
According to our analysis, in Chaudhry et al.'s scheme, the attacker can guess the correct identity and password by using any of the three cases in IV-A. But in proposed scheme, the adversary A cannot guess the correct identity and password of U i even if it extracts the information in SC. We suppose that A can guess the ID i and PW i satisfying the equation A i = A i . But A still cannot be sure if the ID i and PW i are the correct ID i and PW i . A can only guess the correct value by launching on-line guessing. But because the number of the ID i and PW i is enough larger to resist on-line guessing attack, so the smart card SC will be suspended until U i reregisters once the wrong login times exceeds the a fixed value N (such as 5). Accordingly, our scheme has a good resistance to off-line password guessing attack.
C. PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
Consider a scenario where an insider can access the registration information {ID i , l i } of a valid patient and U i turns as an adversary A. A cannot get the password PW i since it is protected by random number r i and one-way hash function. Therefore, the proposed scheme can withstand the privileged insider attack.
D. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
To impersonate a legitimate patient, the adversary A has to obtain the identity ID i and password PW i of U , or construct {PID i , G i }. Firstly, it is impossible for A to guess the correct identity and password of U i according to ''off-line password guessing attack''. Secondly, to construct {PID i , G i }, A has to get the key parameter T . It is still not possible to recover T without knowing the secret key k s . Therefore, our scheme resists against user impersonation attack.
E. SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In proposed scheme, A cannot cheat U i by masquerading as S. Without having the value of T , A cannot recover ID i and C i . So A cannot calculate the correct response message G s . Therefore, our scheme is resistant to server impersonation attack.
F. REPLAY ATTACK
In our scheme, utilization of nonce a i , c s and two-way challenge response mechanism impart resistance to replay attack. If A replays the login request {PID i , G i }, then S would disrupt the session as the replayed G i would not pass the verification test since random number a i used in each session is different. Furthermore, A cannot replay the respond message {C s , G s }, since, random number c s is also different in each session. Accordingly, replay of any message is useless and our scheme is safe from the replay attack.
G. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In our scheme, S authenticates U i by verifying whether G i equals to G i and checking whether M i equals to M i ; U i authenticates S by testing whether G s equals to G s . Consequently, proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication.
H. MAN-IN-MIDDLE ATTACK
In our scheme, the adversary A cannot launch the man-inmiddle attack, since, it cannot pass through the authentication from S and U i . If A wants to pass the authentication from S, it must know the password and identity of U i . From Subsection VI-B, it is clear that A cannot to obtain the ID i , PW i of U i . Meanwhile, A also cannot pass the authentication from U i since it cannot get the private key k s of S. Accordingly, the proposed scheme resists against the man-in-middle attack.
I. PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY
Assuming that the private key k s of S is compromised and that the adversary A obtains the data r s , ID i , PW i , A can compute T . But to calculate the previous session key SK = h(ID i ||T ||c s C i ||C i ||C s ), A must need a i or c s . It is impossible to compute a i from C i or c s from C s and calculate c s C i due to the intractability of ECDLP and CDHP. Thus, even if obtaining {SC, ID i , PW i , k s , r s }, the adversary A is still not able to compute the session key SK . Consequently, the proposed scheme provides perfect forward secrecy. 
VII. SECURITY PROOF WITH BAN-LOGIC
In this section, we present the security analysis of our proposed scheme using Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-Logic) [3] . We provide that the proposed scheme allows the user to establish a session key with the server. Suppose that X & Y are symbols of statements, A & B are symbols for principals, and K is symbol for cryptographic encryption key. Firstly, we list some basic logic notations of BAN-Logic as listed in Table2. Secondly, we mention some basic BAN-logic postulates, and provide the idealized form, security goals and initiative premises of proposed scheme. Finally, we complete the security analysis using BAN-Logic. In this section, for convenience, let U be denoted as U i .
• Basic BAN-Logic postulates:
R1. Message meaning rule:
, that is, if A believes that A and B share K , and sees X is encrypted with K , then A believes B once said X . R2. Nonce-verification rule:
, that is, if A believes the freshness of X and that B once said X , then A believes that B trusts X . R3. Jurisdiction rule:
, that is, if A believes that B controls X , and A believes that B believes X , then A believes X . R4. Freshness rule:
, that is, if A believes freshness of X then A believes freshness of (X , Y ). R5. Believe rule:
• Idealized scheme:
• Security goals:
. VOLUME 6, 2018 • Initiative premises:
. Now, we utilize BAN-Logic postulates and rules to provide that U and S successfully share a common session key sk. S1
. From Message2, it shows that U receives the message
from S. So we have the following:
S2. From S1, A5 and the message-meaning rule, it illustrates that, because U believes that U and S share T , and sees (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ) is encrypted with T , then U believes S once said (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ). Thus, we obtain the following:
S3. From A1, A2 and the freshness rule, we can observe that, because U believes freshness of C s then U believes freshness of (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ). Accordingly, we can get the following:
S4. From S2, S3 and the nonce-verification rule and the freshness rule, we find that, if U believes freshness of (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ) and believes S once said it, then U believes that S trusts (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ). Hence, we deduce the following:
S5. From S4 and the believe rule, if U believes that S believes (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ), then U believes that S believes (U sk ←→ S). Therefore, we obtain the first goal as below: 
S8. From S7, A6 and the message-meaning rule, it states clearly that, because S believes that U and S share T , and sees (U sk ←→ S, C i ) is encrypted with T , then S believes U once said (U sk ←→ S, C i ). So we obtain the following:
S9. From A4 and the freshness rule, we can find that, because S believes freshness of C i then S believes freshness of (U sk ←→ S, C i ). Consequently, we get the following:
S10. From S8, S9 and the nonce-verification rule and the freshness rule, we see that, if S believes freshness of (U sk ←→ S, C i ) and believes U once said it, then S believes that U trusts (U sk ←→ S, C i ). Hence, we deduce the following:
S11. From S10 and the believe rule, if S believes that U believes (U sk ←→ S, C s , C i ), then S believes that U believes (U sk ←→ S). In short, we get the third goal as following: 
←→ S).
Thereupon we obtain the fourth goal as below:
According to Goal1, Goal2, Goal3 and Goal4, we conclude that U (S) has trusted that S(U ) believes on the session key sk between them is shared successfully.
VIII. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the performance of our proposed scheme by comparing it with Chaudhry et al. ' [16] schemes. To compare the computational complexity, we neglect the lightweight operations like exclusive-OR operation and string concatenation. Some operations's descriptions used in our paper are presented as follows:
• T pa : the time for executing an elliptic curve point addition operation.
• T pm : the time for executing a point multiplication operation. • T me : the time for executing a modular exponentiation operation.
• T mi : the time for executing a modular inversion operation.
• T h : the time for executing a hash operation. According to the experimental results performed as [12] , T pa , T pm , T me , T mi and T h are referring to the running time listed in Table 3 which takes 100ms, 130ms, 380ms, 30ms and 1ms on Philips Hipersmart card with clock speed 36MHz, respectively. While for server side Pentium IV Processor with clock speed 3GHz these operations takes 0.1ms, 1.17ms, 3.16ms, 0.3ms and 0.01ms, respectively. Now, we present the comparative analysis at two levels:
• Comparison of computational complexity ( [5] , [16] , [27] , [32] , [34] and the computational costs of our proposed protocol is only 270.39ms. Therefore, in terms of efficiency, the proposed protocol performs the best.
In Table 5 , we find that [5] , [16] , [27] , [32] , [34] lack some security ingredients and have more security problems than the proposed scheme. In Chaudhry et al.'s scheme [5] , the authors declared that their protocol improved varient against user and server impersonation attack and man-in-middle attack applicable on Islam and Khan's scheme [16] . While according to our analysis, we point out that Chaudhry et al.'s scheme [5] is not only still vulnerable to server and user impersonation and man-in-middle attacks, but also vulnerable to off-line identity guessing attack. We find that off-line identity guessing attack is a fatal attack in their protocol. In our proposed protocol, we utilize the technique of ''fuzzy-verifiers'' [31] to resist off-line identity guessing attack. Therefore, the proposed scheme not only amends these security problems of Chaudhry et al.'s [5] and Islam et al.'s [16] schemes but also retains all their merits as depicted in Table 5 . Although, our scheme also employs complex elliptic curve point multiplica-VOLUME 6, 2018 tion operation, however as a trade off, it can resist all knownattacks which are very important ingredients of the security of mutual authentication. In terms of safety performance, the proposed scheme is more secure and has many excellent features compared with the counterparts.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a security analysis of Chaudhry et al.'s [5] scheme and shown that Chaudhry et al.'s [5] scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, user and server impersonation attack and man-in middle attack. In order to remove these limitations, we present a new scheme with refined security. The proposed scheme inherits the merits of the Chaudhry et al.'s [5] and Islam and Khan's [16] schemes and resists the aforementioned attacks with a lower computational costs than others. Meanwhile, we conduct the security analysis of our proposed scheme using BAN-Logic. Finally, in comparison with the previously proposed schemes, our scheme is more efficient and more secure than other related schemes.
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